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PHILOSOPHICAL MYSTICISM AS EPISTEMOLOGICAL METHOD

CHAPTER I

THE DEFINITION OF MYSTICISM

1.

Mz~ticism

as

~

Religious Attitude:

The general problem of the definition of mysticism
may be approached in either of two ways. We might as
semble the elements of all types and method of mysticism,
and, by the use of the critical method, arrive thereby
at a description and definit:!.on of the mystical experi
ence in its most general sense; or we might develop
a restricted, speciflc definition by ignoring certain
aspects of that type of experience which might, in a
broad, general sense, be called mystical. The present
topiC, by its very statement as a philosophical inves
tigation, has already been thus restricted and limited.
Only indirectly will there be any occasion to inquir e
into those experiences which are ordinarily and popu
larly called 'mysti cal'. On the other hand, it! is the
purpose of this discus_slon to define and illustrate
philosophical mysticism, and in order to do this
effectlvely it will be necessary to distinguish the
experience we have chosen to call philosophi cal
(3 )

4.

mysticism from all other experiences whinh have been
various ly classified as instances of the mystical
attitude.
Broad, general definitions of mysticism illus
trate the fallacy common to all such definitions,
namely, the substance of the term defined is lost
in the attempt to extend it over an indefinite number
of instances or occasions of the experience. It then
becomes necessary to correct such rhetorical state
llients by me ans of further definitions, more specific
and restricted in nature. An idea of the general
nature Qf such definitions may be had from the follow
ing examples:
" •••• direct ,mion of the human soul with the
Divinity through contemplation and love ••• based
direct and immediate intuition of the Infinite."

Of

" •••• direct intercourse with God ••• subject and ob
ject are fused into an undifferent~ated on e ••• soul
is identical with what it kll 0WS."
--
"•••• uuion with the Deity••• by ecstatic contempla
tion." ~

1. Sauvage, G.M., article on "Mysticism" in The Catholic
~

'E ncyclopedia.

--

2. Jones, R.M.,

article on "Mysticism" in the Encyclo
pedia of Religion and Ethig~.

3. Blunt, ,J.R.,

art icle OD "Mysticism" in DictiC!.~ of
Sects, HereSies, Ecc~~si~l~~ ~ties,

Etc.



5.

1I • • • • emphasis on immediat.., experience of God, a
direct and intimate consciousness of divine Reality." 4

II ••••un mode de connaiasance etrangers 6.t sUj?erieurs
a llellistence et
la connaissance normales. 5

a.

Here we have five general stateYllenta concerning
mystiCism, but not a single definl tion. As defin:l.tions,
the above instances would take the form: A .!! A. It :is
not illuminating to learn that the mystical experience
Is ecstatic contemplat:ion, that it is direct intercourse
with God, that it is immediate experience of God, or
that :l.ts knowledge is extraneous and superior to the
ordinary forms of thought. The tl'uth of these stat6
m3nts is uIIcri.t:tcally assumed by t he mystic, whereas
these very statements themselves furnish or constitut e
the problem for our iIlvestigation.
The more specific and definite statements of
mysticism err, not in an exces s of generality, but in
seeming to lose the term t h ey are defining in the very
particularity of the definition. Thus Montague, 6 in an
attetllpt to define mysti cism as a method of knowledge,
succeeds only in defining the term "mysticism ll out of

4. Mathews and Smith, article on "Mysticismnin Dictionary
of Religlon .!ill! Ethics.
5. Lalande, A.,

article OIl IIMysticism ll in Vocabulaire
de la Philosophie.
_ ...._ 

6. Montague, W.P.,

The Ways of Knowing, New York, 1925,
Ch. III.

6.

existence. or at least out of his discussion. by some
thing which approaches a reductio ad absurdum of the
two possible alternative explanations of mysticism.
In the first place. he attempts to rationalize the
mystical experience by defining. as mystical. acts of
thought which could by no stretch of imagination be
Classified as mystical experience. The obvious

fail~e

to explain mysticism by this method forces him to the
other alternative. wherein he explains away the experi
ence of mysticism by an appeal to the subconscious, an
explanation of which we shall have more to say presently.
The objection might be made that Montague is not a
mystic. but a logiCian trying to make mysticism logical.
Mysticism, it may be said. has the right to its own
reprssentatives. Then let us examine some accounts of
mystical experience given by mystics and see if they
are more satisfying. We have noted that Montague de
fined mysticism out of existence by making acts mystical
which could not be correctly classified as mystical.

01'

by plaCing the mystical experience in the subconscious,
beyond explanation or description. Those who might
proporly be called mystics arrive at the same end by an
opposite procedure: namely, the attempt to define as
mystical a kind or class of experience for which there
cml be claimed no epistemological validity whatever.
Thus Miss Undln'hill, a contemporary exponent of what

7.

might be called practical or applied mysticism. tells
us that
" •••• in mysticism the w111 is united with the emo
tions in an impas~ioned desire to transcend the
sense-world •••• "
II
It is not merely the power of' contemplating
Eternity. It is the name of the organic process
which involvesethe perfect COnS\Ulllllation of the
Love of God."
Here. and throughout this book and others. we find a
queer combination of' such terms as desire. will. sense.
organic process. and contemplation. illustrating the
indeterminateness of terminology which is characteris
tic of. although not peculiar to. treatments of mysti
cism. In no other f'ield are we asked to accept. as
actual and real, visions which are subjective experi
ences of pure objectivity; super-natural. super-normal.
snd super-rational experiences that do not fall within
the field of the occult; or super-normal visions that
dictate categorical rules for practical activity. This
criticism is not intended to apply only to Miss Under
hill's work; but it would be a waste of' space to give
extended examples of a characteristic which is well
known to any who have the least acquaintance with the
literature of mysticism.
Despite the irregularity and lack of' precision in

7. Underhill. Evelyn.
8. P.84.

Mysticism, New York, 1926, p.79.

8.

these treatments of mysticism, we find one element or
characteristic common and peculiar to all definitions
of the mystical experience. This is the quality of
immediacy. I fail to find a single instance in which
it is suggested that the mystical experience is mediat
ed. Its very essence is its immediacy; and it is this
immediacy which gives to the mystic his ground of
assurance and certainty. The mystical problem of
immediate experience is not, however, to be identified
with the problem of the same name in philosophy. Where
&8

philosophy is interested in the problem of the possi

bility of immediate experience as a source of knowledge,
the mystic assumes the epistemological validity of immed
iate intuition. His own subjective experience 1s proof
enough, for him, of the real existence of the immediate
experience as an experience; and mystics, on the whole,
s.re consist ent in their subjectivity, making no claims
for the objectivity of the mystical experience itself,
although they may request recognition of the objective
validity of its results. For the mystic, the truth and
reality of an experience is guaranteed if it can be
shown to be an immediate experience. Argument on this
question must be postponed; our concern at this point
is merely to identify mystical experience as immediate
experience.
The methodlor modes of attaining the immediate

9.

intuition which is assumed to be the essence of the
mystical experience may be classified as of

tl~ee

general types. We must, however, keep in mIld that
these divisions are not exclusive, but overlap, and
serve only as general distinctions. These three modes
of

i~nediate

experience are:

1. Abnormal hallucination;
2. Ecstatic Vision; and,
3. Rational insight.
The disciplines into which these modes broadly
fit are then: 1. psychology; 2. religion; and, 3.
philosophy. An example of the first mode is to be
found in the frenzied raving of the dervish, in epi
leptiC seizure, and in trances of various types and
origins. This sort of experience, if such we may call
it, we shall exclude as obviously falling outside our
subject matter because of its failure to meet the re
quiroments of intelligibility. There may be some crit
icism of this demand for intelligibility on the ground
that it is an attempt to criticize immediate experience
for not being mediate; but by 'intelligible' is meant
merely that Wllich is comprehensible and therefore
acceptable as valid experience, implying by 'comprehen
sible' that which has a determinate meaning.
All abnormal experience, then, such as dreams,
hallucinatlons, and, in particular, all functioning of
the so-called subconscious are, for the reasons given,

10.

removed from our field of investigation. This problem
of the subconscious will_ however, appear again in our
discussion of the second mode of immediate experience,
so we shall proceed directly to the discussion of that
mode.
In ordinary connections, mysticism is usually
thought of as a characteristically religious attitllde:
both myst:tcisl11 and religion are primarily concerned
with the relations of God and man. Consequently, defi
nitions such as those quoted above tend to treat mysti
Cism, evon in a general sense, as a type of religious
behavior. This is quite reasonable, but the mistake ,t oo
commonly made is that of presuming the mere act of term
ing a religious judgment mystical to constitute a ground
for its acceptance as logically valid experience. The
general use of the term "religious" may signify any
experience from the completely abnormal and irrational
to the completely rational. Neverth eless, mysticism is
a fundamental and essential element of any att:l.tude or
, doctrine which might be called religious; and we might
even contend that the validity of religion depends, to
a great extent, upon the determination of the validity
of its mystical content. The point here is that the
mel'S presence of mystiCism within experience is no
quarantee of the validity of that mystical element as

,-

a
,-j

11.

knowledge.
The second mode of our classification, that of
ecstatic vision, refers to the specifically religious
type of mysticism. This manifestation of religiolls
experience rests, whether so recognized or not, on a

strict cosmological dualism. Communion with the infi

nite is made possible only by transcending the finite;
to reach God the mystic must get away from the world;
hence we find the demand for visions and insights as
the methods of thus transcending the material. Theology
thus presents a conflict between the rationalistic and
mystical pOints of view, the former emphasizing the
wisdom of God as mediated to man and the latter stress
ing the ultimate validity o.r inunediately intuited know
lodge of infinite reality.
Reference has already been made to the common
characteristic of all definitions of mystiCism, the

--

quality of immediacy. By immediate these definitions

•

mean unmediated in the strictest sense. The terlU
immed~

has sometimes been used in philosophy9 in a

sense not contradictory to mediate, but rather as its

I.

the Intuitionists' attempts to define intuition
as 'acquired', as in Bergson.

§.~.,

12.

contrary; but such a distinction will not hold for the
definitions of mystical experience. By immediate the
above definitions mean non-relational; that ;s. either
sub-relational or above and beyond relations, Moreover.
the mystical experience claims. in its purest forms. to
be completely and entirely an experience of immediacy;
an experience. that .1.s. in which subject and object
are completely and wholly identified. This is nothing
more than the contention that the mystical conscious
ness is a state in which awareness or attention. as
cognitive. is not present. Now if this serves to de
3cribe our second mode, that of ecstatic vision or
religious mysticism. then the criticism of this mode
from the standpoint of philosophy and logic is patent.
What possible reality or existence can be attributed to
an experience which is not even a condition of awareness?
Critical philosophy informs .s that awareness is the
primary and fundamental condition of any state of cog
nition. and by cognition we mean an experience of know
ing. not a mere mental state.
How, then, can these apparently contradictory char
acteristics of the mystical consciousness be harmonized?
How can mysticism be an experience of cognition and yet
lack awareness? Two attempts have been made to explain
this paradox. The rational attempt makes of religious

13.

mysticism something very much like the experience we
have chosen to call philosophical mysticism. The other
attelupt is a psychological explanatlon and results In
the reduction of religious mysticism to the level of
abnormal and hallucinatory experience by a more or less
exact identification of the mystical consciousness with
the subconscious. Other explanations of religious mysti
cism have been made which appeal to the notion of the
super-conscious rather than to the subconscious; but
these inevitably end in a philosophy of "genius" or "the
elect", a view wbich practical theology finds exoeedingly
difficult.
The most popular exponent of the psychological ex
planation of religious mysticism is William James. Hls
10
lectures on the Varieti~ of Religious Experience
pre
sented the straw which religion, committing

s~icide

in

the sea of science, grasped with a death-grip. Any ade
quate or detailed discussion of psychological theory Is
beyond our prosent topic; but suoh a lengthy examination
is not necessary to bring out the fallacies apparent,
first, in the attempt to make psychology a complete and
final explanation of experience, and second, in the

10. New York, 1925.

14.

attempted explanation of the subconscious as a condition
of cognition, and finally, in Professor James' exposi
tion of the grounds of religious mysticism. If this can
be done, we shall then have reduced the field of investi
gation to that form of mysticism called philosophical,
which corresponds to what we have previously called
rational insight. Any remaining content of religious
mysticism not already explained as abnormal hallucina
tion or ecstatic vision will readily lend itself to
philosophical explanation.
The subconscious is a hypothetical entity construct
ed to explain certain observable facts of action for
which no explanation can be found under the laws and
rules of psychology as generally formulated. No fact
nor instance of experience can be reduced wholly to
psychological terms, and the reuson why any given fact
of experience, conscious or subconscious, is incapable
of final explanation in psychological terms is merely
this: psychological explanation consists in the attri
bution, to a given fact or to a series of facts, of one
or more qualities which psychology has found to be com
ponents of experience. The procedure can best be explain
ed by a physical analogy. Suppose a chemist were to
attempt an explanation of the compound H2 0 by an elabo
rate exposition of the qualities and characteristics of
hydrogen and of oxygen as independent, unrelated elements.

15.

He could not thereby arrive at any notion of water, but
would forever be restricted to the elemental notiolls of
hydrogen and oxygen as independent, unique entities. No
competent sCientist, however, is guilty of this simple
and

na~ve

error. He realizes that any adequate descrip

tion of the element hydrogen will necessarily include a
description of the combining and reacting properties
and qualities of hydrogen in relation to every other
known element and substanco. We demand such consistency
of the physical SCientist; but we permit the psycholo
gist to abstract elements from experience, to hyposta
tize them into laws and

for~Ylae,

and then we accept as

final his attempt to explain experience by the manipu
lation of these abstract, hypostatized fragments of
expeJ:'ience.
This is exactly the procedure of explanation in
terms of the subconscious. The so-called subconscious
is meJ:'ely one phase OJ:' aspect of the expeJ:'ience of
knowing. The subconscious does not exist apart fJ:'om,
and unJ:'elated to, the other component parts of the cog
nitive function, such as awareness, feeling, imagina
tion, will, etc. To attempt an explanation of cognition
by reference to one of these aspects abstracted from the
whole function is to construct an argument both incom
plete and inconsequential. The psychol ogist is forced to

16.

a oonsideration of the function as a whole before any
meaningful or consistent explanation of the subconscious
can be given. This cannot be done e.x cept by showing how
the subconscious arises as an intrinsio aspect of the
interrelated whole of cognition; and this whole of cog
nition is the necessary condition of any genuine validity
of knowledge. The subconscious, then, as incomplete cog
nition, can make no claim of knowledge content.
James is right when he says that "the subconscious

!!.!1!

is nowadays a well-credited psychological entity", 11

but we can hardly agree with his further statement that
"in it we have exactly the mediating term required" to
12
explain mystical experience.
The very fact that the
subconscious is a psychological entity, and nothing
more, should be enough to inform us that it is not a
mediating term and that any attempt to explain mysticism
in terms of such a hypothetical entity can result only
in disaster for the mystical experience itself. Acoord
ing to James, the subconscious, as a mediating term, is
that which effects our union with the "more";

11.

£2.

13

but he

cit., p.5l1. The passages quoted are taken as
representing a consistent summation of James' entire
argument concerning religious mysticism.

12. P.5ll.
13. P. 511 f.

17.

fails jo give any adequate definition of just what this
"more" is; so, with one term left undefined, the propo
sition means little, if anything, since the meaning of
the relation is primarily dependent upon the meaning of
its terms. A more obvious logical fallacy is present in
his important premise that °there is actually and liter
ally more life in our total soul than we are at any time
14
aware of".
This statement is at one and the same time
both premise and conclusion of James' entire argument,
constituting an obvious petitio. Further, even if this
statement be accepted as a valid premise to his argument
concerning mysticism, it i8 hard to find justification
for the "hypothesis that ••• the 'more' with which in
religious experience we feel ourselves connected is on
its hither side the subconscious continuation of our
conscious life"o15 This may, as James suggests, "preserve
a contact wi<th 'science' whiCh the ordinary theologian
16

lacks", but it at the same time succeeds adJnirably in
defining out of existence both mysticism and experience
as valid

te~s

for epistemology.

The attempt of psychology to explain, by . the use of
involved and technical phraseology, a state of cognition
from which the essential condition of awareness is absent

.

14,

P. 511.

15. P. 512.
16. P. 512.

18.

is neither convincing nor significant. The expressions
"subconscious awareness" and "subconscious thought" are
a,;oh obvious contradictions in terms that it is hard to
conceive how phllosophers of .Tames' capacity could resort
to them. In short. the subconscious. as an entity. is
not intelligible; and as an explanatory principle it
must be rejected by philosophy as at least of doubtful
validity. In so far as religious mysticism relies on
the psychology of the subconSCious to justi.f y its claim.
to be a valid method of knowledge. just so far will the
mystical experience be considered outside the field of
philosophic investigation. It would not be just. however.
thus to classify all religious mysticism; our criticism
here is directed at its reliance upon psychology as an
explanatory method.

2. Mysticism!!!! .! Method

E..f.

Kno\'11edge:

We have. by the exclusion of abnormal and sub
conscious phenomena. narrowed our field of invostigation
to that region of experience which may be deSignated as
philosophical mysticism. This. as we have already con
tended. is encompassed by the third and highest stage of
mystical experience. rational insight. The problem now
confronting us is this: Precisely what . kind or kinds of
experience can we discover. which might be termed mystical.

19.

which have not already been excluded by the previous
argument? Reduced to its simplest terms this problem
becomes that of whether or not the terms philosophical
and mystical are in any sense inclusive I or are abso
lutely exclusive. I am prepared to admit that the use
of the term mysticism as falling within the denotation
of the general term philosophI is not in accord with my
previous insistence upon the use of precise terminology.
My apology for this is that it is a concession to popu
lar usage; the term mystical has been used in a wide
variety and range of meanings, and it has frequently
been applied to philoBOphYI often to the more rational
istic systems; e.g' l to the philosophies of Plato l
Spinoza l Kantl Regel l and Bradley. It might be argued
that in so far as philosophers are mystical they are thus
far not philosophers; but our purpose is to attempt an
explanation of what is meant by the adjective mystical
when applied specifically to a system of philosophy. If
this can be done l it should then be evident whether it
is justifiable to apply the term mystical to philosophy
or whe't her this does in fact constitute a tacit reduction
of the one to the other. The work of F.H. Bradley has
been selected as the best example of a system which
attempts to combine the elements of logic and of mystiCism, the respective methods of philosophy and religion;

20.

9.nd a critlcal discusslon or Bradley's philosophy will
const1.tute the body or our argument at a later pOint.
It was suggested above that the problem of
mysticism is

essenti~lly

the problem of mediate and

immediate experience. Further, we noted that this is
not, 9.t least admittedly, a problem for the mystlc
himself, inasmuch as.mysticism assumes the possibility,
existence, actuality, 9.nd reality of immediate experi
ence as a source or method of knowledge. Herein lies
the distinction between the philosophieal type of
mystieism and all its other forms. The method of phil
osophy is fundamentally and primarily crit1.cal, and
it has only one approach to the problem of mysticism:
namely, a crltical enquiry into the assumed validity
of the mystical intultlon through an investigatlon of
the so-called mystice.l consej.ousness. Philosophical
mysticism then becomes an investigation of immediate
experience, whereas ordlnary mysticism is a

~tatement

of the methods and conclusions of immediate intuition.
The sole distinguishing negative feature of
philosophical mysticism is that i t doos not admit the
mystic's presumption of tho certainty and valldity of
immediate intuition as a method of knowledge. This,
for philosophy, is a matter for investlgation in the
same manner that philosophy must lnvestigate the preill

21.

ill.ses and assumptions of every argUlllent in every field.
This gives to the term

philosophic~

mysticism a defi

nite and justifiable content of meaning as well as a
limited denotation. It does not admit without question
unproved assumptions concerning the validity of the
mystical experience, but, on the other hand, it does
not dogmatically deny that this experience may possess
validity; it does not attempt to develop or discover a
consistent mystical experience, but neither does it
disregard the existential claims of mystical intuition.
The philosopher, then, may very well recognize a mysti
cal intuition, but he is not justified in calling his
experience philosophical untH he has proved immediate
experience valid.
What, exactly, constitutes the philosophical vali
dation of an experience? The method of philosophy haa
already been defined as logic; so it would seem tbat
an experience could be

called philosophical only after

it bad been formulated, or found capable of formulation,
in logical terms. This is precisely what is meant by
philosophical crit f cism. Action, thought, and experience
must be reduced to logical terms in order to be compre
hended; and this is what was meant by the demand that
the mystical experience be intelligible. No definite
ness of meaning or content can be assigned to any phenom

22.

ena not capable of logical statement. The very terms
employed to designate a statement of knowledge 
proposition, judgment, terms - all are logical terms
and imply logical formulation.
Now we have permitted

ou~selves

to become in

volved in a dangerous dilemma. First, we have said
that mysticism has traditionally denied to philosophy
the right to subject mystical intuition to logical
analysis because, it is claimed, mysticism transcends
the ordinary processes of thought and logic. We then
proceed to deny this by saying that mystical experi
ence must be formulated logically if it is to be either
valid or intelligible. One simple way out of the dilemma
would be to deny flatly that mysticism is either valid
or intelligible; but, although it is conceivable that
this might be the true solution, mere denial hardly
constitutes a philosophical argument.
We shall find it imperative, however, to take
issue at the outset with any form of mysticism which
refuses to submit its method or conclusion to logical
fornmlation. Traditional mystiCism, in so far as it
makes claim to transcend thought

and denies thereby

the necessity of logic, must therefore be rejected.
I shall cl&.1m that the boundaries of the intelligib1l
ity, comprehension, and even of the reality of knowledge

23.

lie within the realm of logical formulation. Briefly,
this means that the limits of the poss1bility of
knowledge are circumscribed by logic, logic being de
fined as the method of critical thought. Every argu
ment rests finally upon one or mora assumptions, but,
at the beginning of any discussion, it 1s necessary
to recognize these assumptions for what they are; and
the primary validity of any argument

wi~l

depend upon

the logical validity of its assumptionso
The apparent contradiction between our topic for
discussion and our logical position m1ght appear less
formidable, however, if we remember that intuition and
logical formulation indicate two distinguishable runc
t10ns or activities of thought. We may even contend
that they are distinguishable forms of knowing, each
of which contains elements or aspects necessary to the
knowledge experience. If this should be found to be the
actual case, then it may well be true that the immediate
intuition of mystical experience is valid and justified
and yet dependent, in the ultimate analysis, upon logi
cal formulation.
At any rate, for the present we insist that mystical
experience, which we define in terms of immediacy, must
be an activity, the conclusions of which are capable of
for~~lation

in logical terms. If this involves the

24.

rejection of mysticism as contrary to philosophy, then
so be it. The statement of this problem in both histor
ical and critical form is the purpose of the discussion
to follow.

CHAPTER II

MYSTICISM IN PHILOSOPHY

Three philosophers have been selected as affording
examples of philosophical mysticism: namely, Plato,
Spinoza, and Bradley. The first two, Plato and Spinoza,
will be treated as imperfect types; that is, the mysti
cal element present in these philosophical systems is
not consistent with the whole structure of the systems.
The mysticism of Plato is not an integral, and intrinsic
element of his philosophy, but an attitude of misappre
hension engendered by prejudiced interpretation. The
philosophy of Spinoza, on the other hand, gives evidence
of an intrinsic element of mysticism, although its
presence within the system

appears somewhat in the

nature of a contradiction. In Bre.dley, for the first
and perhaps the only time in the history ,of philosophy,
speculation arrives at a mysticism which, from Bradley's
point of View, is the necessary and consistent fruition
or conclusion of any logical system. Bradley's affirma
tion of immediate experience as the source of our know
ledge of reality contains nothing which is not dorivable
by logical implication and inference from his system of

(25 )

26.

metaphysics. It will be our purpose, in due time, to
stress the point that Bradley's mysticism is not an
adventitious supplement to his logic, inasmuch as it
is derived from, and is inherent in, his system of
logic; that is, mystj,cism is a necessary inference
from his logical premises.
These three examples will not, of course, exhaust
the field of philosophical mysticism,

n~

will the

treatment here be in any way inclusive or exhaustive
of the content of the philosophy of Plato, Spinoza, or
Bradley. The problem for discussion, as stated, is the
determination of that meaning and content which makes
it both possible and necessary that we attribute to
these philosophies an element of philosophical mysticismo

3. Plato the Artist:
Whitehead has said: "Even to this day Plato is
mainly valued as a religious mystic and a supreme
literary arttst".

1

To call Plato an artist does not

in any sense limit his aesthetic acttvity to the per
fection of a beautiful literary style. Plato was not

1. Whitehead, A. N., Adventures of Ideas, New York, 1933,
p. 70.
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an author concerned with the production of an impressive
style, nor was he a sophist whose only end was the es
tablishment of his argument.
Plato may truly be called an artist because his
approach to the problems of life with which he was con
cerned was primarily and fundamentally an aesthetic
approach. This is no more peculiar to Plato than to
the great majorlty of the Greek thinkers and writers
of the Golden Age. This aesthetic attitude is particu
larly evident in the philosophers of the Academy; the
attitude of presupposing the harmony of real and ideal,
the failure to distinguish subject and object, .and the
complete identification of purpose, end, means, and
object are clear indications that, for the ,Greek, life
itself was an elemental aesthetic function.

2

In the

interpretation of Greek thought, much error would be
avoided if critics were cognizant of, and attentive to,
the peculiar connotation of Greek terms.
The question of Plato1s mysticism is inextricably
bound up with his use of myth. One interpretation quite

2. A much better statement of the point I am here attempt
ing to make is to be found in E. Jordan, Forms of
Individuality, Indianapolis, 1927, p.257 : "Th1T
identification of will with the nature of things gave
the consciousness of the ultimate esthetic satiSfac
toriness of things which resulted in the fusion of
fact with thought in the perfected objective systems
of ancient Greek life H •
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commonly met with is that Plato's use of myth indicates
a retreat from philosophy to a crude type of mysticism.
Zeller is of this opinion when he states: "The Platonic
myths, in short, almost always pOint to a gap in sci
entific knowledge",

3

Stace likewise says that "wherever

Plato is unable to explain anything, he covers up the
gap in his system with a myth".

4

This notion that the Platonic myths are not allegor
ical, but that their meaning consists both in their
,l iteral sense and in the feeling Which they call up,
has been most extensively and ably presented by J.A.
Stewart.

5

With all due respect to Professor Stewart's

linguistic abilities, we cannot but reject his in
terpretation of Plato as resting upon a more or less
complete misunderstanding and misconception of Greek
philosophy, which is fatal to any adequate interpreta
tion of the thought of Plato in particular,
Plato's method is primarily that of the dialectic,
but his method is so varied and so unschemat:l.c that
Whitsh sad has called him "the greatest metaphysician,

'---~~'-- '--" -----'-----

3. Zeller, E., Plato
p.

~ ~

161.

Older ,{!.cademy, London, 1888,

4. Stace, W.T., CritIcal History 6f Greek Philosophy,
New York, 1920, p. 171.

5. Stewart, J.A., Jhe }.1yths of Plato, London, 1905.
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the poorest systematic thinker".6 This lack

o~ system

atization is the direct result of what we may rather
ambiguously call Plato's aesthetic inspiration or
artistic creativity. Sometimes it appears questionable
whether a too brilliant literary style is an asset or
a liability to the writer of philosophy; literattwe is
so liable to the criticisms of "mere rhetoric" and
"literary logic". So it is with Plato. We

~ollow

easlly,

yet with precision, his dialectical development of an
argument; and then, suddenly, just as the problem
appears to be working itself into logical formulation,
Plato tells us a story. To the 10gical-IDinded, Plato
must sometimes appear the master of anti ..climax. His
method forces us, if we are to grasp the true natcwe
of his problem, to complete the logical formulation
in our own terms.
I cannot believe that Plato's introduction of
myths at critical points in his argument is any indi
oation that he despaired of logiC as a means to formu
late his problem. Rather, like the artist who first
sees clearly the piotcwe he wants to paint and then
wonders what materials and instruments he shall use
to create it, so Plato formulated his own understand

6.

~. ~.,

p. 213.
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ing in torms most easily grasped by his listeners and
readers. Whether .P lato was conscious of each inter
mediate step in the logical formulation of these argu
ments or whether his coordination of thought was so
perfected that he virtually leaped to an understanding
of the whole is really not ·the question. What is pre
sentod in each myth is not an appeal to mysticism, but
the statement of a portion of the argument which would
have been exceedingly difficult to make clear to his
listeners in strict logical terms, terms which tend
to abstractness. Zeller, Stace, and Stewart accuse
Plato of a mysticism the crudity and puerility of which
are certainly not consistent with his magnitude in other
respects. If their criticism is just, then Plato is
guilty of a 'fault so grievous' that it really need not
concern us here, for such mythological mysticism has no
philosophical significance.
It 1s significant, however, that Plato's most
competent student saw no mystiCism in his teacher's
work, but proceeded to reduce his arguments to strict
logical and dogmatic form, regardless of their form of
presentation, logical or mythical. Aristotle accepted
the doctrine of Ideas as dogma, not as myth.

7

Further I

----------------------

7. pf. Ueberweg, F., Historz of Philos~~hl' trans. Geo.
S. Morris, ~r , 1873, Vol. II,
P. 119; and Stewart, ££. Cit., p.347.
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the ent1re academy interpreted Plato in this way,8 and
the only two alternative systems of philosophy recog
nized by this worthy school were Platonism (including
the work of Aristotle) and Stoicism. Cicero considered
Aristotle to be the systematizer of Plato, and it seems
reasonable to suppose that the exeget1cal authority of
these contemporaries is somewhat more reliable than
that of later theologians. 9
I say Ilater theologians I because it is from these
that the mystical interpretation of Plato proceeded.
According to Taylor,lO PIB.to appears in Western thought
through the channels of Augustine, Boethius, Dionysius
the Areopagite, and Plotinus. In other words, for
Western thought Platoniam becomes Neo-Platonism, and
the latter is accepted, without criticism, as the valid
interpretation of Plato. Dean Inge, for example, in
cludes a chapter entitled "Platonism" in his work on
Christian Mysticism, but fails, in this chapter, to
make a single necessary or valuable remark about Plato,
concentrating his attention almost entirely on the work

8. Taylor, A.E., Platonism and its Influence, New York,

1922, pp.8·=I'15."

9. Cf., Taylor, 22.~it., Ch.I; Ueberweg, ~.~., Vol.I,
p.119; Adamson, R., Develo1ment of Greek Philosophy,
London, 1908, p.149. See a so Stewart1s acceptance of
Milton1s interpretation of Plato in preference to that
of Aristotle, £2.cit., p.347.
lO.~. ~.,

p.20.
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of Plotinus. Now the Plato of Plotinus, or of Augustine
or Boethius or Dionysius, is by no means the Plato of
Aristotle, or we might say, the Plato 1fAaTowgs • Neo
Platonism, like so many Neo's, is a . foster child whose
resemblance to the parent is slight.
As an instance of later interpre'atloB, we find
the popular "ladder of ideas" or "sories of emanations"
as a distinct and peculiar interpretation of Plato's
doctrine of Ideas. No corresponding theory is to be
found in Plato's own words. Yet this notion of know
ledge as a hierarchy of mystical insights is the
source of a vast majority of the attempts to read
mysticism into the thought of Plato. Any attempt to
derive mysticism from Plato himself will consist in
the peculiar and special interpretation of some of
Plato's undogmatic, and perhaps i ndefinite, expressions,
as, for example, hlsfailure to "assume that the more
fundamental factors of experience will lend themselves
to discrimination",

:u or

the fact that his dialogues are

"permeated with a sense of the variousness of the Uni
12
varse".
That such moot questions of interpretation
are to be found in Plato is indisputable; but I contend

11. Whitehead,
12. Ibid., p.

~.

65.

£li.,

p.225.
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that they can be solved only by reference to the whole
of his philosophy and by recognition of the exegetical
competence of his contemporaries, who at least inter
preted his philosophy as a consistent system.
Burnet's admirable statement concerning Plato
furnishes a fitting conclusion to our discussion here:
" ••.•• allegory and myth are not employed to express
something above reason, but to adumbrate what is below
13
reason, so far as that can be done at all",
a state
ment which will assume more meaning as our discussion
progresses. In a sense, it is the sceptical impli
cation contained in the final clause of Burnet's
statement which constitutes our problem.

4. Spinoza!a! Moralist:
As in our discussion of

P1ato~

we shall have more

to say in criticism of contemporary interpretations of
Spinoza than in reference to his work itself. This
procedure is in both cases due to the fact that the
supposed mystical content of Plato and Spinoza is in
a large measure due to, or colored by, these inter
pretations. We have assumed that the reader is familiar
with the general content of these systems of philosophy

13. Burnet,

J.,

Greok Philosophy, R!.I, Tba1es to Plato,
London, 1928, p.16?

34.

and have confined the present discussion to the in
vestigation of any content therein which might be
called philosophical mysticism.
The commentators upon Spinoza meet with a very
serious difficulty in the intimate and intrinsic
combination and coordination, within his system, of
elements both rationalistic and mystical; and the
reader is hard put to it in his attempt to classify
Spinoza as either a rationalist or a mystic.
In the first place, philosophy has by no means
rid itself of the fallacy of ambiguity, and these
are particularly evident in the so-called "popular"
treatments. The easiest way to resolve a contradic
tion is by redefining the two contradictory terms
until their content becomes compatible. The fact
that this results in the destruction of the meaning
of the terms is too often overlooked. In relation
to Spinoza, for instance, we find in Roth's other
14
wise admirable work
a passage of quite unexpected
ambiguity. Faced with the contradictory aspects of
rationalism and mysticism in Spinoza's philosophy,
Roth adopts the subterfuge of defining the term
mysticism in such manner as to exclude Spinoza there

14. Roth, Leon, Spinoza, Boston, 1929.
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from, at the same time placing him well within the
term rationalism. Says Rmth: "If mysticism means that
man cannot know everything, then Spinoza is a mystic.
But if mysticism means that human search after

~lOW-

ledge is vain, then Spinoza is a rationalist of ration
alists".

15

This is most certainly an unaccountable and

unsupportable limitation of the content of mysticism.
Roth himself proceeds to elaborate that aspect of
Spinozals philosophy which has placed him, to all
appearances at least, within the realm of the mystics.
First, however, let us review very briefly the
background of Spinozals mysticism. One factor of
primary importance in considering the mysticism of
Spinoza is the fact that his emphasis was so exclusively
ethical (or practical, in the strict sense of the term).
He himself tells us that his ultimate end is the in
vestigation of the means whereby man may attain eternll
happiness.

16

Hence Spinoza's first and last endeavor

is to formulate a system of ethics wh1ch will ensure the
possibility of man's ultimate and eternal satisfaction

15. P. 55 f.

16."Treatise on the Correction of the Understanding'~ in
Sp1noza ' s Ethics and "De Intellectua Emelldatione'~
trans. A. Boyle, New YOrk, 19l0{Introd.); 1,1 ft.
Hereinafter referred to as Emend.

36.

17
or happiness. No matter in what intellectualistic or
logical or moral terms we define the method of ethics
and the conduct of life, the fact remains that the end
of philosophic investigation and speculation is, for
Spinoza, the attainment of that spiritual rest and
peace of mind Which constitute the state of happiness
for man. In this connection, Joachim says that Spinoza
"is able to give a concrete significance to his ideal
for human conduct, without introducing into his moral

;I. 8'

the ory a set of conceptions foreign to his metaphysics' ,
and that consequently we must, befor e we can understand
Spinoza's ethics, "review his conceptions of 'perfec
tion' and 'goodness'".

19

This is true, relatively

speaking, but Spinoza avoided introducing into his
ethics, conceptions foreign to his metaphysics simply
because his philosophy proceeded in reverse order;
that is, he constructed a metaphysic which would suit
his moral theory. For this reason it is quite impossible
to understand his conceptions of 'perfection' and 'good
ness' without first understanding his practical moral
theory.

17. Spinoza, B. de .. Ethic, trans. W.H.White, Ed.4,
OXldrd, 1930, IV, Appendix 4. (Here
inafter referred to as Ethic).
18. Joachim, H.H.,
19. P.238.

! Study of

~ Etlucs of Spinoza,
Oxford, 1901, ,p.190.
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In the construction of his metaphysic, Spinoza
did not merely auume the parallelism of thought and
extension; he did not accept as

~

priori the faet

that the order and conneetion of ideas corresponds to
the order and connection of things. This proposition
was, for Spinoza, in the nature of a presupposition
made necessary by his fundamental ethical purpose. He
did not, however, attempt any extended justification
of this presupposition, and thus there exists an un
deniable and inescapable contradiction between his
naturalistic metaphysies and his extremely idealistic
ethics. (We might venture the mere opinion that Spinoza
could possibly have rid his system of this apparent
contradiction, but this is a more or less tacit assump
tion that Spinoza is fundamentally logical rather than
mystieal; so, in fairness, let us ignore our opinions
for the moment.) This contradiction, if such it be,
leaves us with but two alternatives: we may discard
Spinoza1s metaphYSics as unsatisfactory and inconsis
tent with his more logical ethical system, or we may
bridge the gap by interpreting certain of Spinoza1s
more or less indefinite statements as mystical in
nature. We could, of course, admit the possibility of
a third alternative: namely, that of the identity of
the metaphysics and the ethiCS; but this would merely
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transfer the contradiction referred to above from that
between the ethics and metaphysics to one internal to
the metaphysical ethics.
There exists in Spinozals work another breach of
continulty, one with which we are mOl'e immediately con
cerned. The mode of advance from the first grade of
knowledge to the second, from imagination to reason,
is obvious; bu.t it is not so evident how man arrives
at the final stage of intuition or scientia intuitiva.
The intrinsic necessity of scientia intuitiva is
apparent, not only to complete Spinozals knowledge,
but also to serve as the ultimate basis of reason. His
system could be neitheI' completed nor begun without
this intuition of "individual essences!!. Then determina
tion

of the mystical content of Spinoza lies in the

definit:l.on of this third and highest grade of knowing.
To return to our original formulation of the problem:
Is Spinozals scientia intuit iva mediate or immediate
in character, or, to be more specific, is the knowledge
gained from intuition inferrHd or immediately appre
hended? ThllS is formulated an additional question: Is
revealed knowledge, or intuition, of the ne.t"re of pre
suppositlon, in contrast to the logical or inferential
nature of mediate knowledge?
It is evident that Spinoza had no intention of

39.

making intuition a unique and independent form of know
ledge. He makes quite clear and definite his stB.tement
that intuition proceeds from, and. is based upon, the
two lower grades of knowledge. Especis.lly does intuition
find a basis of fact and inspiration in the second
20
The development of knowledge is so
grade, reaSOn.
explicitly stated that Joachim is justified in terming
21
it "dialectical";
that is, the two lowel' grades are
absor'bed in the third grade, intuition. Yet, Spinoze.
is

j~st

as definite in denying that intuition is a

mere combination or coordination of the facts gained
from these lower grades of knowledge. Although he con
stantly appeals to reason for guidance, and points to
the development of reason and intelligence as the sole
22
means of attaining good and happiness,
yet he is con
tinually insistent that reason and the products of
deduction are only means to the final intuition, the
implication being that there is something present in
intuition beyond the content of mere deduction or in
rerence. It wou.ld seem that the comprehension of the
essence of things depends upon an immediate apprehen
sian of the attributes of God.

20. Cr.,Ethic, V, 28; also II, 40, 2,
21.

~.

cit., p.252.

22. This is particularly evident in the Ethic, Pt.IV,
including the Appendix.

40.

An excellent, terse statement of the specific prob

lem in relation to SpinozQ, as well as an indication of
the more general problem of the valldity of all mystical
experience, is to be f'ound in Windelband's History.of
Philosophy, wherein he says that Spinoza's theory of
cognition " •••• se't s intuition, as the immediate appl'e
hension of the eternal logical resulting of. all things
from God, as knowledge sub specie aeternitatis, above
23
perception and the activity of the intellect". Now

it this were an exprossion of the only valid inter
pretation of SpinozQ, we would be obliged, unreserv
edly, to term him a philosophical mystic, for this
definition is in substantial agreement with our own
statement of the essential attributes of philosophical
mysticism. On the other hand, it appear obvious that
the above statement is an emphasis of one aspect
of Splnoza's theory of knowledge. We may, as does
Windelband, accept it as the element of major impor
tance in hls system; but this does not justify a com
plete neglect or disregard of the rationalistic, dia
lectical element, which undoubtedly had an effect of ,
tremendous importance on Splnoza's system as

23. New York, 1926, p.409.

Ii

whole.
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Hence it appears that we may stress either the
mystical and immediate or the rational and mediate
aspect of Spinoza1s epistemology. We may say with. him
that the starting point of knowledge is an examination
of the principle of

tl~th

and that this is given in

the nature of the understanding itself, or we may refer
to the fact that the understanding can never descend
froDI universal axiOD1S to individual things, and then
inquire as to the source of those universal axioms.
Thu~

in answer to the question stated above, we seem

to have a choice of answering that intuition is either
mediate infererlce or immediate apprehens:l.on or revela
tion.
Joachim and Roth illustrate perfectly this ambig
uous situation. Their interpretations of Spinoza are
both correct as to detail, but in their general effect
tend to give the reader an impression of two contra
dictory notions of Spinozals scientia intultiva. Joachim
finds, in Spinozals ex.amples, evidence that intuition
is inference, albeit a kind of illlllllUlent inference which
.

24

is itself absorbed in the . final act of intuition.
Dialectic is the mode of the progression of knowledge,

24.

~.

cit., p.184.
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and intuition contains within it the two lower grades
25
of knowing.
This interpretation thus minimizes the
mystical element in Spinoza1s epistemology and empha
sizes its aspect of rationalism.
Quite the opposite is true of Roth1s commentary.
Here we aro told that the second stage of knowledge
passes into the third only when man becomes conscious
26
of his unity with IJ.ature by feeling it wi thin himself.
Intuition is not discursive; that is to say, it is not
inferential in character, but it is the internal ac
quaintance with the inmost constitut1.on of things.
Thus intuition, says Roth, is very much like that ac
27
tivity which Schopenhauer called "artistic vision".
The whole difficulty, I think, lies in the fact
that Spinoza carried his metaphysical parallelism
over into his epistemology, or rather, as indlcated
above, constructed a metaphysic to correspond with
his epistemological parallelism. His assumption that
the order and connection of ideas corresponds, by
identity, to the order and connection of things is a
reduction of causality to logical implication, a

25.

QE. cit., p.262.

26.

QE. cit., p.140.

27. Ibid., p.146.
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substitution of the concept of ground for that of
cause. Thus he may say that a perfect definition
28
explains the inmost essence of things,
and we are
brought back to the problem of what mode of knowledge
is available, other than that of immediate apprehen
sion, from which to constrl,ct such a definition. Here
is the crux of Spinoza's entire system, the crucial
point of which he himself either failed to realize or
neglected to expound. It is these neglected possibil
ities to which reference was made when it was stated
that Spinoza might possibly have removed the apparent
contradiction from his philosophy.
It may not seem quite fair to leave Spinoza at
this point, having made no definite statement as to
his content of philosophical mysticism; but I think
it will prove more just if we pass directly to ml
exposition of Bradley's mysticism, for therein we
shall find, if I am not mistaken, a philosophy which,
in its sympathy with that of Spinoza, approaches more
closely that logical perfection at

wr~ch

the latter

aimed. Thus, through the expaneive work of Bradley,
we may come to a better understanding and appreciation
of Spinoza.

28. Emend., Sec.95.
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5. Bradley

~

Logician:

Quite brief reference to the problem formulated in
Bradley's Logic will serve to show his intimate connec
tion with Spinoza and, also, to indicate the future
trend of our discussion. In the history of modern phil
osophy there is no thinker whose recognition is so
disproportionate to his importance as in the case ot
Bradley. The probable reason for this is the fact that
Bradley quite effectively controverts most of the ortho
dox and traditional arguments upon which much contempo
rary speculation bases its arguments. If some current
writers on subjects philosophical were better acquaint
ed with the work of Bradley, they could not find it
possible to publish page after page of repetitive and
illogical intellectual floundering, and maintain an
honest tace. Because Bradley is intellectually honest,
he represents tor us the true philosopher: his integrity
is unshakeable; he is solid and schematic without be
coming dogmatic; he is firm in his conviction, yet
advances only tentative arguments in proof thereot; he
is a logieian, but is the first to see the apparent
inadequacy of logic in his own system.
In

the LogiC, Bradley suocessfully tormulates the

problem of his metaphysics. His comprehensive discussion
of thought as relational and discursive forCeS him
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continually backward, until finally the problem of our
knowledge of reality forces itself upon his attention.
Instead of avoiding the problem, or uttering a plati
tude in its behalf, Bradley sets himself to the task
of discovering the relation between reality and our
discursive, relational thought processes. He cannot
avoid formulating this as the problem of mediate and
immediate experience.
The nature and content of mediate inference con
vinces Bradley that there is at least a nblurred and
confused totalityll, a primordial feeling, which under
29
lies our conscious processes of inference.
This
early and rather indefinite statement of the IIfelt
unity" or apprehension of totality, which by pre
supposition makes possible the essential relations and
differences of thought and inference, reminds us im
mediately of Spinozals felt and conscious unity of
man and nature, which is both the ground of intuition
and the presupposition of imagination and reason; but
Bradley, unlike Spinoza, neither ignoring nor avoiding
the fundamental problem raised by

no.s

epistemology,

proceeded to an exhaustive investigation of the nature
of this felt unity, of the mode of its operation, and of
its relation to the inferential processes of logical
thought.

29. Principles of Logic, New York,1920, p.456.

CHAPTER III

F.H.BRADL~Y:

PHILOSOPHICAL MYSTIC

If our brief analysis of Bradley's work at the
conclusion of the foregoing chapter is correct, we are
justlfied in terming him a philosophical mystic, for
we have already stated (p.20) that philosophical mysti
cism is the investigation of the validity of immediate
experience as knowledge and that this investigation,
in so far as it is philosophical, will be conf:l.ned to
logic as its method. This should make clear our posi
tion that philosophical mysticism is critical rather
thaD dogmatic; and we have now advanced to a point at
which we can make a more precise, definitive statement
of our subject matter. Philosophical mysticism is

~

method .2!: system of thoug?t which, 1:..aving advanced to
the reCOgnition

£f immediate experience as

~~e

of our contact with reality, llicontends that

source
~

immediate experience has meaning, and becomes intelli
gible, only
ence;

~

~

formulated in terms of mediate experi

is, when expressed

.!!1

the logical

~

of

the jUdgment. This latter contention gives rise to the
investigation of its validity as knowledge.
(46 )
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The present chapter will constitute an attempt to
discover, from an analysis of his work, whether we are
justified in attributing to Bradley the epistemological
method stated in the above definition. In the opinion
of the writer, few philosophers have been so carelessly
and inadequately treated as has been Bradley; the reader
will consequently pardon the present discussion if at
times it seems to stress unduly some apparently obvious
points which have been carelessly, or perhaps studiously,
avoided in contemporary criticism.

6.

~

Analysis

E.f Thought:

As we have already implied, the problem of mysticism
is fundamentally the problem of knowledge, a problem to
which has been attached the term epistemology. Epistemol
ogy, as a separate field of investigation, seems to have

had its conception in Locke and its logical formulation
in Kant's treatment of judgment. While Kant's epistemol
ogy was essentially logical in nature, constituting an

investigation of the nature of the act of judgment, at
t h e same time it involved certain psychological observa
tions which eame as new and unique additions to the
data of philosophy. Hen ce, Kant's description of judg
ment aroused the tremendous controversy concerning the
separation and opposition of subject and object in the

48.

act of knowing. FoDPwing Kant, the attempt was made
to solve the problem of epistemology on psychologi
cal grounds, avoiding its logical and metaphysical
implications, an attempt wlrlch had the negative re
sult of contusing the issue.
It is undeniable that psychology does, in a
sense, furnish the starting point for the investiga
tion of knowledge and that it provides certain facts
which must be taken into consideration in any treat
ment of the epistemological problem, Mere psychology,
however, can never do more than furnish restricted
and more or less hypothetical information of an em
pirical nature; it is therefore inadequate for the
formulation of the problem of knowing. Bradley was
perhaps the first to recognize the true value of
psychology, its importance and its inadequacy; and
thiS, in itself, lends value to his treatment of the
problem. Logic held a primary position in Bradley's
system, not

on~y

chronologically, but genetically;

yet he was extremely careful to see that none of his
logical constructions contradicted the observations
of psychology. In fact, most of hi s illustrative
material is couched in terms and examples of a dis
tinctly psychological character.
Before proceeding to an analysis of Bradley's

treatment of il!ll1lediate experience as a source of
knowledge, we shall find it both useful and necessary
to point out just how this particular problem arises
in his thought. It is not, for

~,

a major or pri

mary subject of investigation, but its consideration
is necessitated, and assumes tremendous importance,
as he proceeds in the attempt to define reality and
the absolute. Bradley's essentially synoptic method
made it obligatory that he neither allow his logical
investigation to obliterate psychological fact nor
permit his formal logic to be contaminated or adul
terated with psychological views. In other words, his
logical method was forced to psychology for an ex
planation of certain aspects of the knowing process,
but Bradley's logic never becomes 'psychological'.

1

Philosophy, says Bradley, has as its aim the

I. The reader may perhaps find the following treatment
of Bradley's philosophy somewhat less detailed and
specific than that ordinarily to be expected in a
dissertation of this type. ThiS, I think, may be
excused on the ground that we are dealing here with
one whose thought rather uniquely combines a synthetic,
unschematic vision almost equal to that of Plato with
the careful regard for details and the slavish insist
enoe upon precise terminology to be found only in the
logician. Bradley's system (and here i ,s a philosophy
which can truly be called a system)would be quite
vitiated by a textual, word-by-word, casuistic anal
ysis. Only by attempting to understand his thought
as a whole and by so interpreting it can we hope to
arrive at a just ' appreciation of Bradley as a phil
osopher.
'

::
"
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satisfaction of the intellect:. All. sides of our nature
demand satisfaction, and in this sense it can be said
tl1at our whole nature philosophizes. Now it is self
evident that the intellect can find ultimate satis
faction only in truth, and truth, in the final analy
sis, is that which is aoherent and comprehensive.
nSystem is the arbiter of fact lt , and perfect truth
must realize the idea of a systematic whole, when we
mean by truth that which would satisfy the intellect.
Thought aims at its own satisfaction and contentment
in a coherent, comprehensive, all-inclusive system
or whole.

2

The question now arises whether or not such a
system is possible of achievement and whether, in
fact, such an absolute totality is even capable of
conception or

forw~lation.

From an analysis of the

nature of thought, it becomes evident to Bradley
that the achievement of this all-inclusive unity

Abbreviations -.to .follow:
F.R., The Principles of t8g~C, New York,
~O, (Reprint of
8 edition).
A & R: Bradley, F.H., Appearance and Reality, Ed.2,
London, 19~
T & R: Bradley, F.R., Essays on Truth and Reality,
Oxford, 1914.
Logic:

Bradley~

2. A & R, p.165 f.; T& R, ChoI, p.188 f., p.2l9f.;
Ethical Studies, Ed o2, Oxford, 1927, pp.248-5C.
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is quite impossible for thought. The most meager de
scription of thought shows that it is essentially
relational and discursive; that is to say, the con
tent of thought will always take the form of terms. 3
Now we cannot conceive terms without accepting or
assuming relations, and it is his insistence upon
the opposition occasioned by thought's content of
terms and relations which has caused some to criticize
Bradley as emphasizing the Hegelian principle of dia
lactic in a negative sense only. 4
Although terms and relations form the content
of thought, as mere facts they have no meaning what
soever of themselves. We cannot even conceive an
isolated term or relation. l<urther, two or more
terms and the relations between them would be equal
ly meru1ingless until made intelligible by logical
formulation, and the form of this expression is the
judgment. The perception of a relation between terms

~~-'---'--'-'---------'---------

3. Throughout the discussion of Bradley, we shall
use "term" in a more limited and abstract sense
than hi ,g own use. This is done to facilitate the
explanation, for Bradley's use of "term" implies
all the explanation and description attempted by
us here.

4. E.g., DeLaguna, T., "Review of Essays on Truth and
Reality"in the Journal of Phn')SOPh!, Psychology, ~
Scientific .¥ ethod, Vol o 12, Pt.I, p~ 58. Cf., Logic,
p.382; A & R, Ch.XV; T & R, pp.126, 225.

---
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or faots is then just this expression of those facts
as terms of the judgment. Judgment is thus the asser
tion of the relation of faots. In order to thus relate
facts, it is necessary that the judgment make reference
to reality, for only by referring facts to reality
are they conceived as real and thereby true and mean
-5

ingful.
Thought manifests

tp~s

continual effort to relate

terms by reference to reality, in order that its con
tent may assume meaning and coherence. Thus intellect
strives toward its goal of satisfaction by attempting
to establish a relation which will make its content
of terms complete and all-inclusive. To accomplish
this, the reality-reference of the judgment would
have to be one of identity between the subject and
predicate terms; that is, between reality (as sub
ject) and fact.
Hence arises the problem of the essential
opposition contained in judgment as the formal act
of thought. I say 'essential' because without this
discursive and relational character the judgment

5. LogiC, Bk.I, Ch.l; A & R, Ch.XV; ~ R, p.2l0.
Compare the argument following to that of Bosan
quet on the "a priori character of judgments of
value", ImEli~ation and Linear Inference, London,
1920, pp.9 ,150. Bosanquet makes clear the corol
lary of the above argument, that every judgment
is a judgment of value.
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could not exist and thought could not fUnction.
The very essence

o~

thought is the diversity in

volved in the relation of terms and relations. Yet
how can thought hope to attain coherence and com
pleteness

i~

its very nature is so necessarily re

lational and incomplete? It would appear that thought
is at a continual impasse in its attempt to attain
that coherent and comprehensive unity which consti
tutes truth and reality and its ovm
The analysis
important

~acts

o~

satis~action.

6

thought thus demonstrates two

concerning our knowledge. In the

first place, it is evident that ultimate truth, as
the

satis~action

o~

the intellect, is such by nature

that it can never be completely contained in thought
and judgment. Secondly, this is true simply because
the nature of thought is such that it cannot encom
pass reality. This latter

in~erence

is derivable from

the fact that it is only within the absolute unity
of reality that ultimate truth could be contained.
Then to attain ulti!llate truth thought would have to
make the judgment an expression of the totality
whioh is rsality; Buch attainment is manifestly im
possible. We cannot identify truth and reality

A & R, Bk.I (esp. Ch.II),
eh.XV (esp. pp.181-2), pp.360-62; T & R, pp.
114-1'7, 257, 329.

6. Logic, pp.525-28j
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(although their ultimate distinction for Brad.lay
appears to be a matter of emphasia), but i t .f ollows
from the nature and definition of truth that , if it
is to be conceived as all-in clusive and c onsistent,
this truth can have existence only within such a
systematic

who l~

as that which constitutes reality.

7. Thought ane! Reality:

A third inference has been drawn from this
apparent dichotomy of' thOllght and reality: namely,
that since thought is relational and reality nonrelational, thought paJ.' ticular and reality univer
sal, then thought can never even approach a c om
prehension

01'

description of reality.

7

Bradley

holds, however, that the analysis of judgment gives
evidence of an internal character of judgment which
accepts or rejects Judgments according to their
ability to satisfy the intellect.

8

Inasr!ll~ch

as the

satisfaction of the intell ect can be attained only
in reality, we must then sny that this character of
Judgment is, to a degree at least, a manner of recog

7. This is essentially the position of the Agnostics,

who thus formulate the metaphysics (if it really
is metaphysics) consistent with empirical logic.

8. T & R, Po 39l.
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nizing or perceiving reality. It is the

transce~d

once of the relational judgmental form by the judg
ment itself.

9

Just how gratuitous this explanation

is on Bradley's part we shall not questioa.
Bradley's position here rests upon definition
of terms. the recognition that there is a vast dif
ference between the admission of thought's inability
to attain reality and the statement that it cannot
10
comprehend reality.
At first glance it may appear
that Bradley has set up an opposition between thought
and reality which makes even contact between the two
impossible. How is thought. whose substance is par
ticular. existent terms. ever to attain that ultimate.
universal. non-relational reality which alone makes
possible the reduction of that reality to the level
of discursive reason; that is. to the judgment? To
understand the manner in which Bradley conceives
reality to find expression in thought. it is neces

9. T & R. p.391.
10.

E.~ •• compare the statement of Bradley in reply
to Pro.f essor Stout If • • • • that no one. except Prof.
Bosanquet. has emphasized more strongly than my
self the impossibility of thinking anything
whieh is unreal". T & R. p.276.
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sary to bear in mind two facts: first, that non
rolational does not mean undifferentiated; and sec
ond, that contact with reality is just as essential
to the nature of thought as the attainment of reality
~

is rendered impossible

Ez

the nature of thought. It

1s quite impossible to conceive a unity which is not
differentiated, and the so-called contradictoriness
of a non-relational, differentiated unity arises from
the confusion of relatlonallty and dlfferentiatioIl.
Further, a confusion has arisen through the
contention of some critics, the realists in partic
ular, that only those things which are r eal could be
actual or possible objects of knowledge. Now that
whleh Bradley has described as appearance is a
possible object for the knowing process, and the fact
that it is an ideal construct in no way affects its
status as an object of knowledge.

11

In fact, the

difficulty lies, not in the attempt to e.x plain how
the thing of appearance becomes an object of know
ledge, but rather in the investigation of how reality
itself can be conceived as objectified and accessible
12
to thought.

11. Logic, note p.7, p.10; A & R, p.453.

12. Cf., Eaton, R.M.,

S~bolism

and Truth, Cambridge,

1 5, p.89.
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For Bradley, then, the problem of truth has its
genes is in the question of how thought makes contact
with reality and how it proceeds in the attempt to
identify thought and reality and thus attain satis
faction; for, despite the apparent hopelessness of
the attempt, thought nevertheless continues to man
ifest the desire to unite and identify the subject
and predicate of judgment. This Bradley explains by
reference to the nature of judgment.
Judgment is formal, but it consists of terms
which are particular, and here arises the difficulty
of distinguishing the form, content, and activity of
the judgment. Terms have no meaning whatsoever until
expressed in judgmental form; that is, until their
relation is made explicit. Therefore, this relation
expressed in judgment must be something more than the
mere relation of one term to another term by similar
ity, contiguity, or association. This would be the
admission that the meaning-content of terms was con
tained in those terms and would result in the defini
tien of knowledge as the recognition of mere causal
13
connection, a vie~ not supported by the facts. The
judgment then expresses a meaning not to be found in

13. LogiC, Bk.II, Ch.I.
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its terms taken individually or collectively, nor in
the causal relation of those terms.
Thus is formulated, in simple terms, the problem
of knowledge, not only for Bradley, but for all theo
ries which find themselves compelled to advance beyond
mere psychology. The problem in religious mysticism,
for example, is the explanation of a knowledge-content
in the mystical experience which cannot be explained
by simple reference to the terms of that

e~perience.

When the attempt is made to explain or validate mystl
cal kriowledge by a mere reference to the terms of the
experience, the whole system ends in an appeal to an
irrational faith, the formulation of a perfect

~etitio.

This should make clear that there is a problem of
knowledge common to mysticism and to philosophy, at
least to that philosophy which has been called ideal
ism: namely, the question of immediate experience as
the source of the reality-content of judgment, of a
non-relational unity as the ground of the function
and formulation of discursive reason and mediate ex
perience.
An examination of the route traveled by mystiCism

and philosophy in the investigat10n of knowledge will
show that both travel the same road for a time. Let

.
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us hurriedly pass along this road with them to the
cross-roads where their ways part. The given fact
from which we start is that experience, and experi
ence only, is the source of any knowledge whatsoever.
The problem then is to de.fine experience, and this
task may best be approached by an analysis of know
ledge and the act of knowing in order to determine
what constitutes this experience which makes knowledge
possible. Assuredly we must recognize the content of
physical fact in knowledge, and here we must depend
upon psychology to furnish details. We need no t tarry
with these details. however,

for all that is involved

in th.1s stage of our journey is mere description of
physical and physiological fact. The cruder types of
mysticism and epistemology are satisfied to stop here
and rest, content with the beautiful scenery; but a
glimpse of the endless road stretChing into the dis
tance convinces us that we have barely begun our
journey.
Knowledge is not explained by psychological de
scription; there is a difference of content between
fact and meaning; and the insistence of the mystic
that we accept his experience as fact evades the
problem of its validity as knowledge. The recogni
tion of this implication forces us to leave our
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fellow travelers. who take a side road into the
Valley of Content. while we push on to a rougher and
harder road. We have yet to explain the unity of
knowledge. the mamler in which terms are related.
for it is only from 'I;he solution of this problem
that we can derive a criterion for the validity of
knowledge.
Ass~mg

that the essence of judgment is its

content of meaning or knowledge. what then shall we
say of the ground or source of that meaning? Clearly
i 'l; is not to be found in the terms of the judgment
nor in the relations which the judgment expresses.
Relations may indeed be evidences of the ground for
which we seek. but they themselves could not. of
course. be that ground.
Apparently we are left with but two alternatives:
either the act of judgment is a creative activity and
hence not formal. or terms and relations do not con
stitute the entire content of judgment. Bradley re
solves this dilemma dialectically by absorbing both
alternatives in his discussion of inference and its
relation to judgment. Concerning the first alterna
tive, that of the actIvity of the judgment, it might
be well to point out that, although we do call the
judgment

all

"act" of thought, yet judgment proper is
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rather the expression or formulation of thought tmd
not itself the activity. This is not always clearly
expressed in Bradley's work and the ambiguous rep
resentation of judgment as an "act" of thought is
the source of much misundersttmding.
The operation or function of the intellect is
of the nature of inference, and Bradley agrees that
explicit inference is a conscious operation whose
activity ends in the judgment. In other words, judg
ment is not inference, but the formulation of the
product of inference. Inference is the activity of
the intellect, the act of knowing; judgment is the
statement of the inferential relation, the assertion
of knOWledge. Judgment is the form which all infer
ence must take, and this is what was .eant when it
was said that judgment is the assertion of the re
lation of facts. Judgment may give us the formal
content of knowledge, but it can never explain the
source or activity of knowing. We are forced back
to a description of the process of inference, and
it is his treatment of inference which constitutes
what is perhaps Bradley's outstanding contribution
to the history of thought. His treatment is pro
found and unique,

e~denced

by the fact that a

contemporary of the capacity of Bosanquet frankly
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admits that he was some time in understanding its
14
fUll significance.

8. Reality in Immediate Experience:

Here, at last, after our rather extended intro
duction to Bradley, do we come face to face with his
postulation of immediate experience as the ground of
inference; but, after thus following his investiga
tion to this pOint, the place which will be given to
immediacy within his system becomes perfectly evident.
The subject of inference is terms, and the process of
inference

is the relating of those terms. This much

is clear from the statement above, and, as we have
pOinted out, this entire procedure is relational,
discursive, and therefore incomplete and to this de
gree incoherent. Wh.ence, then, comes that unity which
we have agreed must characterize knowledge and all
statements thereof?
~

\ There is, says Bradley, and must be, an under-

l

lying unity and totalIty which 1s the ground and
presupposition of all mediate exper:Lence. No mental
state of any type or kind is conceivable unless we
grant the actual and re8.l existence. of this unity

14.

~.

cit., p.115.
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as the totality within which the differences and
relations of these mediated states (inferences)
find their differentiation. It would be an un
warranted and tedious digresslon for us to attempt
here a justification of Bradley's fundamental posi
ticn that differentiation or relationality is con
ceivable only on the assumpt :ton of' a unity within
whi ch d1fferenoes and relations lie or' fall. In the
preceding outline of his thought, this point has
been made clear, and, for the present at least, the
reader must be content to accept this dual and
mutu.al implicat i on of unity and relationa11ty as
"
one of Bradley's presuppositions • J.,.

One thing at least 1s clear: namely, that this
necessitated unity cannot be conveyed, represented,
or contained in thought or reason. At this point
the Bradle1an is forced to agree with the tradition
al mystic that, to this extent, thougbt is impotent;
that neither thought, reason, intellect, nor logic
is capable of giving us contact with, or knowledge
of, reality. The point made by Bradley, however, is
that it is the nature and operation of the intellect
as inference, formulated in judgment, which pOints

•.
For a crit1.cism of Bradley's "presupposltions"
see Maointosh, D.D., The Problem ?f Knowledge,
New York, 1915, p.379.

------~

(i5.
~
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the way to our recognition or the means whereby we
do attain and know reality. It is the rulalysls or
inference that tells us exactly what it is we are
s eeking as the reality-content of judgment, and
without th:l.s guide we would never be able to recog
nize or discover the true nature of this reality
ccntent. The mystic's rulswel' would be, then, that
all such investigation is nonsense. You have admit
ted our contention, he might say, but wish to cover
your tracks with the dust of abstractions ruld the
fog ot theoretil:cal vagaries. I think we will be
forced to adrait that the mystic has, temporarily at
least, disturbed the logical foundation of Bradley's
system, inasmuch as Bradley does not say that reality
is interred, but consistently maintains his contention
16
that reality appears to us in and through feeling.
The fail.ure to recognize reality as inferred
excludes fronl thought ruld reason the capacity to
attain reality, and Bradley is forced to the posi
tion that tbe only other function to which we can
attribute this capacity to represent reality is
feeling. Thus, that unity which validates all know
ledge becomes, in terms of experience, anfelt-unity"

(£6. Logic, Bk.III, Pt.II, Ch.IV;

LBsfl.,

Ch. VIII,p.333.
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or "felt-totality".
This function is embodied
in a
--.
specific type of experience, different in kind from
the mediate form of discursive reason. Feeling is
immediate in nature; the experience itself is in
the nature of completeness and unity. This does not
mean that feeling is merely the vehicle appropriate
to the representation of reality, for it is just the
reality-content of this felt-unity which gives to it
its character of inunediacy.

On this point we must also insist that, although
our analysis of thought drives

1-1S

to the postulation

of this unity, we are not thereby justified in claim
ing that reality is a mere presupposition necessitated
by our need of a ground upon which to rest the dif
ferenees discovered as essential to thought or infer
ence. Bradley defines immediacy as that experience
in which no distinction is made between the aware
ness and the object of the awareness. In feeling,
subject and object are identified, and there is no
distinction between the act of knowing and the end
of the knowing process; but immediate experience is
still experience, and the feeling of unity or total
ity which evidences reality is something of which we
are actually aware. Further, the awareness of immed
iate

experience is no less cogent or real than the
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attent1.on of mediate thought, to which mediacy we are
prone to limit the term 'awareness'. In fact, we are
almost forced to say that it is only the awareness of
immediate experience that is real, that feeling is
the actual source of any awareness we can have. Im
mediate experience, then, is a valid cognitive func
17
tion.

By a subtle misinterpretation of Bradley, we
might find it possible to involve him, on this pOint,
in the famous, or infamous, ego-centric predicament,
the nemesis of idealistic epistemologists. If reality
is presented in immediate experience or feeling, and
immediacy is defined as absolute unity, as an experi
I

ence in which there is no distinction between knowing

~

and object known, between awareness and that .o f which
it is aware - if all this be admitted, then what can
p~event

us from carrying the argument to its logical

conclusion and saying that the feeling is reality?
If this primitive feeling of immediacy, this felt
uni ty, is reality, it is nonsense to. say that thought,
which is only possible on the assumption of the actu
slity of this feeling, attempts to attain reality,
unle88 we mean that thought is continually attempting

17. T & R, Ch. VI, XIV.
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to reduce itselr to feeling. On this view we must
admit that thought is the thorn in the flesh and
that logic is not only useless, but a positive
h:l.ndrance to the reality aspiration.
Bradley was careful to provide against any such
criticism of his theory of reality. Such criticism
fails to interpret correctly the terms of his argu
ment, terms upon whose precise definition he was
always so careful to insist. Reality is an infinite
given whole, and to say that such is contained in
the knowing subject is contradictory. To be sure,
the finite self is a centre which manifests this
felt-totality, but it is unjustifiable to conclude
that the self' thererore contains the whole of reality.
If this were true there would be no conflict between
and reality, for thought should be able to
18
comprehend, all wi thin the finite centre of self.

tho"l~ght

The unity, coherence, and inclusiveness which
belong by nature to reality find concrete manifes
tation within the finite centre of the selr. It
follows that this manifestation will be restricted
by the nature of the selr, which is finite, incom
plete, and un-harmonious; but it would be fallacious

18. T & R, p.18G.
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to say that the reality which we know is thererore
incomplete and finite. Such would not be reality.
What we can and must say is that reality must as
sume a particular, rinite form in order to be known.
This problem of the mannel' in which reaU.ty is con
tained in l:romediate experience and or how it becomes
an object for thought is one of the most difficult
Bradley has to face, and his treatment of it is not
exactly lucid at all points.

ask how re

nlity becomes an object for feeling, for we have
already painted out that in immediate experience
there is no distinction between the object and the
feeling. In immediate experience we have a feeling
of unity, not a knowledge of it; reality is present
in feeling, not set off from it as ~ Object.j In
other words, Bradley is forced to admit the dis
tinction of thought and feeling, and it is the
apparent absoluteness of this distinction that
raises the question of how we know feeling and its
content; that is, how immediate experience becomes
an object for thought. This is made particularly
difficult by our recent conte.ntion that thought
and reason can never get entirely beyond immediate
experience, that our felt-unity is the necessary
ground of all discursive reason and mediate experi
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ence; for it me'a ns that innnediate experi,ence
in a

sense~

other

hand~

must~

become an object for itself. On the
this seeming dj.fficulty is the basis of

our solution of the problem. If feeling is the
ground from which thought cannot

escape~

distinction between the two can hardly be

then the
absolute~

and it is not unreasonable to suppose that a knowledge
relation is possibl e between the two, supplementing
1.9

the relation of dependence.
Reality ie contained within

feeling~

but when

ever that feeling becomes an object for thought it
must find expression in the relational, discursive
for~

which all thought takes.

Evidently~

reality in

the form in which it appears as an object of thought
will always be incomplete and neither a true nor
actual representation of reality.
are

forced~

Nevertheless~

by the very incompleteness of this

we
object~

to set up an idea of reality as ultimate totality and
coherence. In one respect the reality-content of
thought represents the particularization of reality
as universal; and

again~

it might be called the ac

tualization of reality as ideal.

20.

~R~Pp.32,

251 f.

20
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Th:l.s is the ground upon which we may say that
reality is contained within the judgment. The subject
o~

every judgment is reality, the "whole

in

~act;

o~

reality"

but nevertheless this reality, though whole,

is limited and conditioned. Ideally, reality is
whole, complete, and unconditioned; but as expressed
in judgment - that is, as actualized in thought
forms - reality is limited and conditioned by those
forms and is to this extent incomplete. Reality,
therefore, in its entirety remains an ideal, exter
nal to thought and the judgment, and never possible
of attainment. Bradley admits thiS, inSisting that
i

the continued dialect1;cal development of thought
toward a system

o~

knowledge is, in its progress,

constructing a system of knowledge which approximates
more and more to an understanding and

~ormulation

o~

absolute reality. It is evident that the mOl'e exten
sive and precise are our definitions of the

terms

in judgment the more nearly will these terms approach
identity.

H~.s

evidence of what was previously

referred to as Bradleyls "negative" use of the dia
l-eeti-c. In the development of thought the opposition
evidenced in diversity provides the ground of higher
syntheses, but the dialectical process does not pro
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ceed toward reality. as Hegel thought. Rather it is
the opposition between thought and reality which is
the very essence and origin of the entire dialecti
21
cal process.
We

~~st

agree that this is not a very satisfac

tory conclusion to our investigation of knowledge
and experience. Bradley transports us with pains
taking care to the realm of scepticism and then
leaves us with the simple explanation that he has
shown us the entire road so far, that neither he nor
we have any means of transportation along whatever
road may stretch ahead. even though we can partially
discern the limits of that road. Such is the situa
tion. says Bradley. and rather than pervert the facts
or carry you off on a blind road, I have defeated my
own end and failed to find our destination of intel
lectual satisfaction. At any rate. he might add. an
intelligent acepticism is

~ch

to be preferred to an

irrational contentment. "There is no Sin, however
prone to it the philosopher may be, which philosophy
22
can justify so little as spiritual pride~

21. LogiC, p.379 f.; ~~, Ch.VI,XI; A & R, eh.XXIV.
See also Muirhead, J.E., ~ Platonic Tradition
in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy, New York, 1931,pp.289
291, 298-300.
22. A & R, p.7.

CHAPTER IV

THE VALIDITY OF IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE

The material for this discussion has been very
definitely limited ·to one particular phase of the
general problem of knowledge: namely, that con
cerning the validity of immediate experience as a
source or method of knowledge. Bradley was selected
as presenting the best example of a consistent,
philosophical formulation of this problem. In con
clusion, then, I shall summarize very briefly
Bradley's formulation of immediate experience as a
method of knowledge and indicate what appears to roe
to be the major problem which his statement leaves
unsolved,

9. Summary £f Bradley's Argwnent:
In a general sense, Bradley's system leaves us
with the same difficulty as that encountered in our
examination of Spinoza's metaphysics. Each of these
thinkers maintains the idealist position of postu
lating metaphysical monism as the grotmd of thought
and experience. Neither of them, however, finds it
(72 )
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poesibla to avoid dualism in epistemology; and in
the end they leave us with an unrasolved contradic
tion between their metaphysics and epistemology. This
contradiction is especially stimulating because it is
evident from tha nature of the case ·.that there should
not, in the final analysis, be any distinction other
than one of emphasis between cosmic theory and the
theory of knowledge. The situation is not relieved
by the recognition or the paradoxical fact that the
postulation of metaphysical monism becomes necessary
only upon the recognition of epistemological plural
ism. We may say that if knowledge does exist, then
it must take the dialectical form of thought, and
from this sitllation or fact we might derive the ne
cessity for a grpund in the rorm or absolute unity;
but the mere abstract postulation of a relation, even
though logically necessary, serves neit:h.er to explain
nor to describe that relation. Abstract justification
cannot be substituted fOI' concrete descript I on. This
indicates the only valid distinctIon between meta
physics and epistemology: namely, the fact that meta
physics is content if the logical necessity or reality
can be proved, whereas epistemology cannot rest short
of a description of reality in its relation to thought
and the knowledge process.
Therefore, it is this very distinction which serves
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as the ground of the identification of

metaphys:l.,~s

and epiatemology in the problem of reality or sub
stance. Epistemology is primarily concerned with an
investigation a.nd description of the knowledge pro
cass; but whenever such explanatIon advances beyond
mere psychological classificatIon, the immediate
questIon becomes that of the rea 1 ity of knowledge,
indicat:!.ng thereby the metaphysIcal problem of the
nature of reality. Thus it is tha.t any epistemology
worthy of the name is of necessity a metaphysics. In
.l ike manner, philosophy as a body of thought has,
throughout its entire history, found itself forced
to the problem of reality or substance as the ulti
mate and major problem of speculation. The ultImate
end or synthesis of all philosophical investigation
ruld speculation is an explanation of the nature of
reality. In particular is this true of Bradley's
philosophy. Every particular argument :!.n his entire
work suggests, points to, and finally culminates in
the conception of reality which is the implicit end
of his speculation.
The point from which Bradley starts his specu
lation concerning the nature of reality is the recog
nition of thought's inherent desire to find certitude,
satisfaction, and completion for itself and its ao
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tlvity. This, says Bradley, could be contained in no
less an inclusive whole than reality. His argument
concerning reality, and it is this argument which
constitutes the fundamental premise for his whole
syst~m,

may be briefly summarized as follows:
1. Reality, as unity, completeness, and

satisfaction, is a logical necessity
to thought and experience;
2. Neither thought nor logic has the ca
pacity to attain, nor even completely
to express, that reality;
3. The only alternative mode of appre

hending reality is feeling; therefore,
4. The reality-content of thought, reason,

and experience is presented in and
through feel:l.ng.
Thus, in outlining Bradley's description of the
knowledge process and function as well as his ex
planation of the validity of immediate experience,
the previous chapter shows clearly the peculiar dif
ficulty involved in his essential and implicit def
inition of reality, a definition which makes neces
sary his apparent recourse to, and reliance upon,
immediate experience or feeling as a source of

know~

ledge. So it seems that Bradley's system manifests a
paradoxical inconsistency: though his method is con
fessedly and obviously logical, Bradley appears forc.d

1n the end to posit feeling as the only source of our
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knowledge of reality. and feeling could hardly. by any
stretch of imagination. be called a method. much less
logical method. Bradley the logician is then

su~ject

to the acousation of confusing his logic with the
simplest kind of mystioism. and it would seem that
he has left himself open to the criticism of Suder
mann's Mad Professor by constructing a philosophy
"engaged in the sorry business of smuggling in the
back door what was thrown out the front". Although
having declared himself formally wedded to Logic.
Bradley cannot resist the temptation to carryon a
clandestine affair with the mistress Mysticism; but
his fundamental method is not suited to deception.
and he is finally forced to admit the contradictory
and deplorable state of affaira. to find himsel!
paying homage to two loves. impelled on

~he

one side

by obligation and on the other by desire.
What then shall be our final estimate and cri
ticism of Bradley's epistemology? Shall we accept
the statement that immediate experience. as feeling.
is the sole source and means by which we know and
recognize reality. that the necessary ground of
thought and experience is a "fel't -unity or

"~

totality"? This "recognition of immediate experi
ence as the source of our contact with reality" is

77.

the first stage of philosophical mysticism; and if we
grant that Bradley advances thu.s far, then we must
also admit that he takes the second step: namely,
the formulation of that immediate experience nin
the logical form of the judgment" in order to give
meaning and intelligibility to immediacy. It would
seem, then, that we are justified in calling Bradley
a mystic; and in recognition of, and deference to,
his logical formulation, we may be justified in fur
ther terming hlm a philosophical .l I1Ystic.

10. Immediate

~perlence ~

reeling:

Before definitely deciding this point, let me
remind the reader of an important statement made at
the very beginning of our discussion (p.ll f.);
namely, that which pointed out the essential contra
dictoriness of the terms mediate and immediate as
used in connection with mysticism. Immediate experi
ence, we said, 1s unmediated, non-I'elational, and of
the nature of pure feeling. Thus it is a pure or mere
state of feeling which mysticism attempts to make a
valid mode of knowledge. This is perhaps the most im..
portant single point in our en·t ire discussion: the
realization that, for mysticism, the distinction be
tween mediate and immediate experience is as absolute
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as any distinction can be; that these terms are, as
we stated in the beginning, contradictories and not
contraries. Mediate refers to thought or reason, in
dicating the presence of terms, relatedness, and in
completeness of a dialectical nature; immediate .r e
fers to feeling,

indicating the absence of terms as

such, unrelatedness, and a completeness or unity of
a type distinctly non-dialectical and non-progress
ive. The assertion of the validity of immediate ex
perience as a method of knowledge is then the asser
't ion of the priority of feeling over reason, at least
in a particular case, as a source or mode of knowing.
The particular case in which immediate apprehension
claims validity over reason is that which concerns
our knowledge of reality. In this respect we must re
alize that philosophical mysticism is not an organic
or synthetic co-ordination of the methods of phil
osophy and mysticism; philosophy is not made mysti
cal, nor is mystiCism made philosophical. Consider
able effort was made to avoid antiCipating this con
clusion; but even in the definition of philosophical
mysticism (p.46) it is quite apparent that the demand
for the formulation of immediate experience in logi
cal form constitutes a tacit attempt to reduce mysti
cism to philosophy. We have continually emphasized
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the essential contradiction between the method of
philosophy and that of mysticism, and this contradic
tion prevents any real synthesis of the two. In so
far as the philosopher relies on

mystici~m,

-

he is

thuB far not a philosopher (Cf.,p.22 f.). In accept
.

ing feeling as a method of knowledge. he is rejecting
reason and logic and thus turning aside from philos
ophy, for logic is the only method of knowledge rec
ognized by philosophy as valid.
Now it is true that philosophy must accept as
material for investigation the data of all the various
sciences and disciplines. and it was in this sense
that we defined philosophical mysticism as the accept
ence of immediate experience as a method of knowledge
•

subject to philosophical investigation. Our discus
sion has shown, however, that such investigation im
mediately resolves into tIle task of attempting to
give the data of immediate apprehension some degree
of logical form. for only when. and if, this can be
dODe are we justified in accepting the data of mysti
cism as valid for philosophy, and immediate experi
ence as epistemological method.
Bradley's peculiar importance to the present dis
cussion lies in his successful demonstration of tIle
fact tllat the data of mysticism. the facts of immedi
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ate experience, do not lend themselves to formulation
in the logical, judgmental form. Thus we said "in
deference to" Bradley's logic we call him a philosoph
_~

mystic, for it is obvious that the term is a

misnomer, constituting a contradiction in terms.
Philosophical mysticism, then, consists of the attempt
to hold, at one and the same time, two contradictory
and opposed theories of lmowledgej and although the
process of such formulation is extremely valuable for
the history of thought, it is hardly conducive to
that satisfaction of the intellect which Bradley held
to be the inherent demand of thought.
Shall we then consider the importance of Bradley's
work to lie in the fact that he formulated an ultimate
contradiction, that he held to a consistent logical
method in epistemology but forsook logic for feeling
in his metaphysics, and thereby proved that logic and
feel:ing, mediate and immediate experience, philosophy
and mysticism, are essentially different and distinct
and can never be brought together? To so estimate
Bradley would, I think, be unjust. That such is the
essence of his system might be assumed from a super
ficial examination of his work or might be argued by
selecting certain phrases and sentences in isolation
from the body of his thought and method. Further,

81.

such an interpretlttion will be justified as long as
we insist upon interpreting his term "'"
immediate
in the
,....----
sense in which mysticism uses the word. Bradley is
tbe outstanding example of a philosopber who intends
by immediate to indicate a contrary rf.lther than a
contradictory of EIediate (9.£., p.l1 i.
To such an inte!'pretation there may be raised
a justifiable objection: namely, that Bradley him
self uses innnediate in a sense synonomous with feel
ing, as evidenced by bis terms "felt-unity" and "felt
totality". If Bradley did nol1 mean tbat reality is ap
prehended by an experience of immediacy as feeling,
then why did he conshltently select the terms feeling
and felt to express bis meaning? Certainly this would
be an avoidable and inexcusable ambiguity to be charged
to him. As indicated in the previous chapter, he very
definitely states that because the nature of thought
is such as to render impossible its apprehension of
rea11.ty, then reality can and must be experienced
only by some power or faculty which transcends thou.ght,
and this he describes as feeling. The experience which
comprehends reB.lity is therefore an experience of
innnBdiacy.

82.

11.

~

Persisting Problem:

The solution of this contradiction :1.8 really not
so difficult as it seems. It consists merely of de
fining terms, or rather, of recognizing the defini
tion given them by Bradley. Again we appeal to his
whole system as furnishing the only satisfactory
explanation of particular problems arising within
that system. There is no hope of understanding
Bradley's appeal to immediate experience until recog
l1i tion is made of the peculiar sense in which he de
fines feeling. This is especially difficult because
Bradley excludes from feeling that characteristic
which in ordinary usage is taken as its very
subjectivity. In the terminology of

essence~

mysticism~

the

essence and substance of immediacy as feeling is
subjectivity; hence its adaptability to psychologi
cal explanation. For Bradley, however, subjectivity
is not only considered non-essential to the function
of feeling, but is actually a characteristic which
it would be difficult to attribute to immediate ex
perience. ,Vhen he says that the immediate experience
of reality transcends thought, Bradley means just
that it transcends subjectivity in the ordinary
psychological sense.
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The question then aris e s concerning the sort of
definition which can be given feeling as exclusive of
subjectivity. To understand the problem involved

her~,

it is necessary to go beyond Bradley's own statement.
Now this does not mean to imply that Bradley did not
realize the implications of his statement of the
problem of knowledge and of reality; but it does
mean that he left a very definite problem unformu
lated. Perhaps this particular problem would have
been more adequately and completely stated if Bradley
had written his

~thical

,Studies last instead of first.

The probleln upon which depends the definition
of immediacy and feeling as used by Bradley is that
of indivIduality or the individual. Coinciding with
the psychological description of feeling as essen
tially subjective, is the philosophically naIve

ex~

planation of the individual as ,a subjective entity.
Bradley recognizes, impliCitly, that upon such a
description of the individual it is quite impossible
to give any consistent definition or explanation of
individuation.
Reality must be individual, for the real is
that which exists independently, that which depends
upon nothing else for its substance or existence;

8.4 .

and this is exactly

wl~t

individuality means. How

then can we speak of any finite centre as an individ
ual when manifestly all such centres are mere attri
butes or appearances of reality? Reality its.eli' is
the only true example of individuality. Thus the
problem of knowledge, of how we know reality, of the
manner in wl1ich we become cognizant of the ground of
thought end experience, is really formulated by
Bradley as the problem of ir,dividuation. The prin
ciple of indivi duation is the mode or manner by
which thought, evidenced in f:!.n:t tEl centres called
selves, attains reaJ.ity, and this mode or manner is
oalled by Bradley feeling or immediate experience.
It is so called because it is plainly not of
the nattwe of discursive re ason; but this is not to
say that reason and thought are not a part of its
nature. A .! !ine

~a

!!2!! need not be exclusively so,

and the mode of attaining reality is no more neces
sarily nor essentially of the nature of feeling
than of the nature of thought. It can

b~

neither

pure feelir,g nor mere discursive reason. It seems
reasonable to suppose that Bradley would have done
much to clear his work of confUsion and ambiguity
had he coined some new word to indicate more exactly

85.
what he intended by feeling and immediate experience.

That be did not mean to imply that reality is appre
hended by a subjective, mystic(I.l experience of pure
feeling appears self-evident. From the point of view
of philosophical investigation, at least, be has
quite successfUlly demonstrated the inadequacy and
contradictoriness of mysticism as a mode of knowledge.
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